The Sunny & Sailabout Saga: rescue no 2 described

This is the story of the rescue of the crew of the s/y Sailabout, that went to look for the Atlantic rowing boat 'Sunny' after it had been abandoned in severe weather in the China Sea en route Subic Bay to Hong Kong. Soon after leaving Subic Bay the Sailabout and crew found themselves involved in another tropical storm. 'Mayday' was called for the second time in a week, and Pryke and his companions were rescued (again) after a combined operation involving international rescue services and commercial vessels.

Earlier parts of the story have been reported on Sail-World.com

The whole series of events has attracted a certain amount of comment among sailors and other members of the 'marine community' here in Hong Kong - not all of it favourable. Received opinion is that the rescue services and associated personnel are to be complimented and congratulated, but a certain amount of censure has been directed at Stuart Pryke himself. In the interest of fair reporting, here is Pryke's story, in his own words.

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The Subic2Hebe Challenge took a new twist on 14 May after a decision was made by the ops team in HKG to recover the Atlantic Rowing Boat, 'Sunny'. Both oarsmen were up for the challenge, since both weather windows and a sound ship were favourable. Stu Pryke was elected to accompany the sailing boat, 'Sailabout', an apparently well-founded, schooner rigged, ferro-cement yacht. The vessel, with a crew of three and passenger, departed Subic Bay almost 12 hours behind schedule.

Sea conditions were 'ragged' but manageable with the yacht comfortably handled under sail and engine. Thursday afternoon highlighted some safety inconsistencies, some of which included an acute shortage of safety equipment, no paper charts, no manual bilge pump, no SSB/HF or storm sails. In essence, assumptions were made, driven by the experience and recommendations of third parties, that the 'Sailabout' was sound and fit, safe for sea and up for the task. Indeed, the vessel was described as a 'capable offshore yacht'. In fact, the contrary was more the case.

As weather conditions deteriorated early on Friday 16 May, Pryke put a satellite call out to Roger Eastham to enquire about weather forecasts in lieu of no met information from the skipper, Mr John Young. A tropical depression was reported, south of position and predicted to arrive close to the vessel's position for Saturday 17th approx 0200 hrs. Wind speeds were forecast in excess of 60 kts, gusting 80 kts. Sea state was likely to reach Force 10 to 11.

The decision was made by Mr Young to steer for high ground and the unlit shoaling area of Hermana Mayor. The folly of such a decision was vetoed by Pryke, due to no pilotage or paper chart information being available. It was night, and buoyage was non-existent. It was debatable whether the anchor and windlass were any better serviced than the other fixtures of the vessel, and this led to a decision to run towards open water and the southwest quadrant of what was now a well-developed and deepening depression, now known as STS Halong.

Prior to this information, the skipper was asked on two occasions both by Pryke and the senior deck crewman, Ali, whether it was prudent to put back to port in Subic. This suggestion was dismissed by Mr Young who described the weather as being 'benign' by his standards. As conditions deteriorated towards gale force 8 to 9, Pryke elected to take command and order stations to weather and take up a south westerly heading and into safer water in order to minimise the effects of STS Halong.

In the process of this recovery, conditions deteriorated further such that all sails (bar the untrimmable headsail) were destroyed. The auxiliary generator, driving both the computer chart and the auto helm, at that time the primary steering device, became unstable, leading to eventual failure. Manual steering was then inevitable and this highlighted a significant problem associated with the helm. The hydraulic steering had significant null zones, probably associated with low hydraulic accumulator pressure in the system. As a result, heading control was target +/- 70 degrees. The wave map was now hard port abeam, laying the boat to hull frequently. Passage speed was less than 5 knots. This was not helped by extensive growth on the hull and prop, with cavitation evident in both.

Conditions gradually deteriorated towards extreme and the crew began to show very low morale. Ali and Pryke became the functional crew and decision processes were made by them and assisted by Mr Young. It was discovered that Mr Young suffered from an acute bronchial complaint that may have clouded his judgement skills.

With a failed auxiliary generator, the vessel taking water and no primary navigation references, Pryke decided to contact the Sunny operations team in Hong Kong and request detailed information and location of this weather system by satellite phone, a residue from 'Sunny'. Additionally, he had a personal life jacket and personal EPIRB (emergency position indicator radio beacon) registered with Falmouth, UK. The boat had two ship-style EPIRB beacons that were unpowered. There were no life raft, no jackstays, no safety harnesses or flares. Pryke announced his concerns in his penultimate communication to his Hong Kong operations team. The weather at that time was tending towards extreme and barely manageable under manual steering off a weak helm.

By Saturday morning at approximately 0520 hrs with a poor sky and limited light, the full extent of the weather field could be observed. Ali and his fellow junior crew member took it upon themselves to occupy a threatening engine room, aflood with oil and other bilge residue, estimated with sea intake to be approximately two tonnes of ingressed water. Pryke on the helm had to deal with the visual aspect of a fully developed force 11 gale. The flaking bow and the inability to hold a consistent heading proved difficult and physically demanding, this was endured until 0650 hrs. At this point, a rogue wave with a severely cresting surge appeared port side and midships. An effort was made to effect a heading into the face of this system but wave face and extreme gradient forced the yacht to dip toward her starboard rail. The trawler style wheel house door then imploded with the impact of water. The air displacement caused a hydraulic lock in the cabin and the three 'crew' became partially winded with Mr Young transported across the saloon floor to atop the secondary galley worktop. The gross effect, other than severe damage to the structure of the wheelhouse assembly and remaining glass, was flooding of the engine room, already saturated up to the top alternator belt and battery housing.

Pryke then instinctively placed a mayday call on channel 16 VHF, activated his personal EPIRB, then both the ship's EPIRBs and placed a last satellite call to Hong Kong operations, requesting MRCC (Marine Rescue Coordination Centre) assistance. Pryke and Ali then proceeded to shore up a jury rig to the port side door, protect the starboard companionway door, and secure some of the window system. Continuous Mayday calls were being made during this process with Mr Young being coerced to assist in this process. A second crewman, Tony, figured in this event although suffering the effects of advanced sea sickness. No bilge pump was available to evacuate water from the engine room such that over 60 drums of water were manually discharged overboard through the starboard side cabin porthole.

During this period, the engine finally failed. The yacht was now adrift, naturally lying ahull and making over 2 knots abeam the swell. Two further knockdowns occurred, mitigated somewhat by her long keel. All crew decided that the boat was in grave danger of sinking. The starboard companionway door was showing further signs of weakness and the jury-rigged port side door was already becoming stressed. Further to this, the galley floor was awash with over two feet of water and all provisions had now been lost. Indeed, for a so-called charter, weak provisioning had prevailed and was not able to sustain a 5-day passage in comfort. Water was restricted.

Between the bailing out of the engine room, mayday calls and rest periods, management of Channel 16 remained paramount. By approximately 1200 hrs, HKG Rescue 38 made contact. This was a Jetstream 41 aircraft, one of two in service and with full SAR capability. Three life rafts were carried but due to the extreme weather, none were dropped. The communications relay and on-site prevalence of this little aeroplane was truly comforting and boosted moral immeasurably.

Two commercial vessels committed to assist the Sailabout and recover her crew, with the LNG tanker Mill Reef becoming the on-site vessel to effect the rescue in 'critical' conditions. At 1600 hrs and with the Mill Reef lying ahull the weather, creating her own micro-climate that impacted the way of the Sailabout, the recovery of crew began.

This can often and usually is, a critical point in any rescue. Rope boarding ladders are assigned and serendipity usually prevails when crew have to transition from vessel to rescue. This day, minor injuries scored low on the transfer to safety, although the yacht sustained impact damage due to hydraulic interaction with the hull of the Mill Reef.

The recovery, in itself deserving of substantial narrative, involved rocket lines, lost possessions, injury and politics but ultimately, as in all rescues at sea, it is about recovery of lives. In this, we were very lucky. The crew of the Mill Reef, the team at GFS (Hong Kong Government Flying Service), the crew of Rescue 38 (GFS Jetstream 41 aircraft), MRCC, Roger Eastham, the Subic2Hebe operations team were ALL pivotal in the safe recovery of souls. They and their consultants performed admirably and for that we, as survivors, are eternally grateful.

This was and remained a team effort throughout. Decisions are not made individually. The judgment to pull out of the row was team. The judgement to effect recovery of 'Sunny', team too and the safe recovery rescue of 4 souls, three crew and one charterer but crew by default, was team. The synergy of the collective was paramount and will remain so. It prescribes honour within the group and in the end affected the lives through the safe recovery of four men. Men who without the team ethos of GFS, S2H ops, MRCC and Roger, wouldn't be here now.

The Challenge has no individuals; it began as a team to effect a money trust to the Sunnyside Club and the kids who need us to dare to care. There is no room for armchair quarterbacks, political saracens and cheap journo jazz.

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